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Case Note 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING SIMILAR FACT 
EVIDENCE IN SINGAPORE 
Pushing Boundaries of Admissibility 
Public Prosecutor v Ranjit Singh Gill Menjeet Singh 
[2017] 3 SLR 66 
Micheal Anak Garing v Public Prosecutor 
[2017] 1 SLR 748 
This piece addresses two recent local decisions on similar fact 
evidence that demonstrate the court’s difficulties with 
reconciling the provisions of the Evidence Act with a more 
flexible approach that can be developed through the common 
law. These two cases extend the basis for admitting similar 
fact evidence beyond ss 11(b), 14 and 15 of the Evidence Act. 
The application of the common law balancing test comparing 
prejudicial effect and probative value has also been 
broadened to consider factors such as the timing of the 
objection to the evidence and whether a co-accused wishes to 
rely on the similar fact evidence. Yet, the cases do not discuss 
the conceptual and normative justification for so doing, 
taking us further down the path of pragmatism over 
principle. 
Eunice CHUA Hui Han* 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), LLM (Harvard); 
Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. 
I. Introduction
1 Over the past few decades, the state of the rules surrounding the
admissibility of similar fact evidence1 in Singapore has been consistently
* I would like to thank my long-suffering husband, Chen Siyuan, and my family for
their encouragement and support in the writing of this piece. I also wish to
acknowledge the classes of evidence law students that I have had the privilege of
teaching for inspiring me to enter into a previously uncontemplated area of
research. I would finally like to express appreciation to the anonymous referee for
the helpful comments on the piece.
1 “The rules governing similar fact evidence concern the exceptional circumstances
in which the accused’s acts on other occasions (ie, occasions other than the one
(cont’d on the next page)
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described in rather dire terms, such as facing “intractable difficulties”,2 
being difficult to “make sense of ”,3 and “tricky” to formulate.4 
2 For the purposes of the discussion in this case note, the current 
Singapore approach to similar fact evidence may be said to be embodied 
in three decisions. The first is the Court of Appeal decision of Tan Meng 
Jee v Public Prosecutor5 (“Tan Meng Jee”). In that decision, the court 
superimposed the common law balancing test of Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Boardman6 (“Boardman”), where probative force of a 
piece of evidence is weighed against its prejudicial effect, onto ss 14 and 
15 of the Evidence Act,7 which relate to using past similar acts to prove a 
state of mind. The words of ss 14 and 15 do not reference any balancing 
of prejudicial effect and probative value although they do embody the 
concept of probative value through their requirements.8 Nevertheless, 
the Court of Appeal proceeded to apply the Boardman test and 
suggested the framework of examining the cogency, relevance and 
strength of inference of a piece of evidence to assist in the balancing 
exercise.9 In effect, however, these three factors were applied in lieu of 
ss 14 and 15. 
3 Secondly, in Lee Kwang Peng v Public Prosecutor10 (“Lee Kwang 
Peng”), the High Court hearing a magistrate’s appeal defended the 
approach in Tan Meng Jee as conceptually sound because the Boardman 
test had been “encapsulated in the wording” of ss 14 and 15 of the 
Evidence Act.11 Accordingly, this approach did not undercut the 
inclusionary scheme of the Evidence Act that where a fact is admissible 
under (at least) one of the specific relevancy provisions,12 it would be 
                                                                                                                               
which gave rise to the offence) are admissible to prove his guilt (by reason of their 
similarity to, or connection with, the circumstances of the offence”: Jeffrey 
Pinsler SC, Evidence and the Litigation Process (Lexis Nexis, 6th Ed, 2017) 
at para 3.001. 
2 Ho Hock Lai, “An Introduction to Similar Fact Evidence” (1998) 19 Sing LR 166 
at 195. 
3 Chin Tet Yung, “Remaking the Evidence Code: Search for Values” (2009) 
21 SAcLJ 52 at para 1. 
4 Chen Siyuan & Lionel Leo, The Law of Evidence in Singapore (Sweet & Maxwell, 
2016) at para 5.187. 
5 [1996] 2 SLR(R) 178. 
6 [1975] AC 421. 
7 Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed. 
8 Michael Hor, “Similar Fact Evidence in Singapore: Probative Value, Prejudice and 
Politics” [1999] Sing JLS 48 at 56. 
9 Tan Meng Jee v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 178 at [52]. 
10 [1997] 2 SLR(R) 569. 
11 See Lee Kwang Peng v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 SLR(R) 569 at [40]. 
12 Specific relevancy provisions refer to ss 14–57 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 
Rev Ed), which correspond, in effect, to the exceptions to the common law 
exclusionary rules. They are to be contrasted with the general relevancy provisions, 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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admissible. The High Court further interpreted s 11(b) of the Evidence 
Act as a provision by which similar fact evidence could be admitted to 
prove actus reus. As with ss 14 and 15, the High Court read the 
Boardman test into s 11(b). The court recognised that this use of s 11(b) 
ran contrary to the intention of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen (the 
original drafter of the Indian Evidence Act on which Singapore’s 
Evidence Act is based), which was for similar fact evidence to be 
admissible via the specific relevancy provisions of ss 14 and 15 and 
which “did not accommodate the possibility that similar facts might be 
probative of the actus of a crime in addition to its mental element”.13 
However, the High Court thought that it was justified in disregarding 
this intention to “pave the way for future treatment of the Evidence Act 
as a facilitative statute as opposed to a mere codification of Stephen’s 
statement of the law of evidence”.14 
4 Finally, in Ng Beng Siang v Public Prosecutor15 (“Ng Beng Siang”), 
the Court of Appeal, without specifying any provision of the Evidence 
Act or the test to be applied, seemed to approve the admission of similar 
fact evidence “as a matter of completeness” for the “limited purpose of 
providing the court with a complete account of the facts”.16 
Commentators have described the approach taken in this case as 
invoking the concept of “background” evidence, whereby the court 
prefers to be apprised of as much evidence as possible (the maximisation 
of discretion) without being overly impeded by overly technical points 
of evidence (the minimisation of rules).17 Although the discussion on 
similar fact evidence was peripheral in Ng Beng Siang and did not 
obviously contribute to the development of the law as did the decisions 
of Tan Meng Jee and Lee Kwang Peng, it is still a decision worth reflecting 
on because the cursory treatment of the similar fact evidence point 
reflects a certain attitude that is worth comparing with the two recent 
cases and that forms the subject of this note. 
                                                                                                                               
ss 6–11, of the Evidence Act, which enumerate the general ground on which facts 
are relevant on the basis of their probative value. The relationship between these 
two categories of provisions pose difficulty because they may overlap and it is not 
clear whether a fact that does not pass muster under the requirements of the 
specific relevancy provisions can be admitted via the very broad general relevancy 
provisions: see Chen Siyuan & Lionel Leo, The Law of Evidence in Singapore 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2016) at para 2.025 and Jeffrey Pinsler SC, Evidence and the 
Litigation Process (Lexis Nexis, 6th Ed, 2017) at para 2.025. 
13 Lee Kwang Peng v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 SLR(R) 569 at [45]. 
14 Lee Kwang Peng v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 SLR(R) 569 at [46]. For a critique of 
this case, see Michael Hor, “Similar Fact Evidence in Singapore: Probative Value, 
Prejudice and Politics” [1999] Sing JLS 48. 
15 [2003] SGCA 17. 
16 Ng Beng Siang v Public Prosecutor [2003] SGCA 17 at [42]. 
17 See Chen Siyuan & Lionel Leo, The Law of Evidence in Singapore (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2016) at para 5.132. 
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5 All three cases, with varying degrees, demonstrate the court’s 
difficulties with reconciling the Evidence Act with a more flexible 
approach that can be developed through the common law. The source of 
this difficulty lies not only in the inclusionary framework of the 
Evidence Act, where evidence must fall under one of the relevancy 
provisions to be admissible, but also s 2(2) of the Evidence Act, which 
repeals all rules of evidence not contained in any written law so far as 
they are “inconsistent” with the Evidence Act.18 Unfortunately, despite 
an opportunity in 2012 when the statute was amended, Parliament has 
not intervened and the provisions relating to similar fact evidence have 
not been changed from when Stephen drafted them in 1872. 
6 Later courts have had to live with the uneasy compromises 
made by precedent and find their own solutions to admitting similar 
fact evidence. The cases of Public Prosecutor v Ranjit Singh Gill Menjeet 
Singh19 (“Ranjit Singh”) and Micheal Anak Garing v Public Prosecutor20 
(“Micheal Anak Garing”) are instances of this pragmatic approach and 
the sacrifice that has been made of fidelity to the Evidence Act and the 
principles it embodies. 
II. Summary of cases 
7 In Ranjit Singh, under the surveillance of officers from the 
Central Narcotics Bureau, the first accused (“Ranjit”) handed the second 
accused (“Farid”) a plastic bag containing heroin and then collected a 
package from Farid containing methamphetamine. Ranjit and Farid 
were charged with trafficking heroin under different provisions of the 
Misuse of Drugs Act.21 
8 The issue was whether evidence concerning: (a) previous 
transactions involving heroin or other illegal items referenced in 
statements made by Farid and Ranjit; and (b) a series of dealings 
involving the quantity of methamphetamine that Ranjit received from 
Farid and that Ranjit subsequently delivered to another party, were 
inadmissible because they concerned the accused’s acts on previous or 
unrelated occasions, and constituted similar fact evidence of which the 
prejudicial value outweighed its probative force. 
                                                          
18 See generally Ho Hock Lai, “An Introduction to Similar Fact Evidence” (1998) 
19 Sing LR 166 at 186–187 and Jeffrey Pinsler, “Approaches to the Evidence Act: 
The Judicial Development of a Code” (2002) 14 SAcLJ 365. 
19 [2017] 3 SLR 66. 
20 [2017] 1 SLR 748. 
21 Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed. 
© 2018 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
 PP v Ranjit Singh Gill Menjeet Singh; 
 Micheal Anak Garing v PP  
 
9 The Prosecution relied on ss 14 and 15 of the Evidence Act to 
admit the evidence on previous transactions involving heroin or other 
illegal items to show the accused’s knowledge22 at the time of the offence 
and regarding the drugs or, in relation to the series of dealings involving 
the methamphetamine, to provide the court with a complete account of 
the facts under ss 6 and 9 of the Evidence Act. 
10 Ranjit’s counsel applied to exclude from evidence: (a) the 
portions of Ranjit and Farid’s statements concerning the two areas 
mentioned above (“the disputed portions”); (b) two Health Sciences 
Authority (“HSA”) certificates relating to the methamphetamine in the 
package Ranjit received from Farid; and (c) three photographs of the 
package and the methamphetamine. 
11 The High Court admitted the evidence of the disputed portions, 
citing Tan Meng Jee and Ng Beng Siang and applying the common law 
balancing test of weighing the probative force of a piece of evidence 
against its prejudicial effect derived from Boardman. The High Court 
found that the evidence was cogent as they were contained in voluntarily 
given statements, relevant to the mental state of Ranjit at the time of the 
offence and sufficiently weighty to be considered in relation to the 
merits of any potential defence that Ranjit did not know what the white 
plastic bag contained apart from “something illegal”.23 
12 Two further points were noted by the High Court as militating 
in favour of admitting the evidence.24 First, in relation to Farid’s 
statements, Farid’s counsel did not object to any part of them being 
admitted and stated that he would, for the purposes of Farid’s defence, 
be relying on them in their entirety. Secondly, the objection had been 
brought at a fairly early stage of the trial when it remained unclear what 
Ranjit’s defence would be. Accordingly, the High Court thought it would 
have been premature to exclude the evidence at that stage. As Ranjit’s 
defence turned out to be that he had either no knowledge of the 
contents of the plastic bag he gave to Farid or no knowledge of the 
contents beyond their illegality, this confirmed the relevance of the 
evidence. 
                                                          
22 Although the Prosecution could rely on the presumption of knowledge within 
s 18(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) – that a person who is 
proved or presumed to have had a controlled drug in his possession shall, until the 
contrary is proved, be presumed to have known the nature of that drug – there was 
an issue of whether Ranjit was able to rebut the presumption by showing that he 
only knew that he was delivering something illegal or even drugs generally, but not 
that he was delivering heroin. 
23 Public Prosecutor v Ranjit Singh Gill Menjeet Singh [2017] 3 SLR 66 at [19]. 
24 See Public Prosecutor v Ranjit Singh Gill Menjeet Singh [2017] 3 SLR 66 at [20]. 
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13 The High Court excluded the evidence of the HSA certificates 
on the basis that it related to the quality and quantity of 
methamphetamine in the package and this was not relevant to Ranjit’s 
state of mind or any other element of the offence, or to the case against 
Farid. As for the photographs of the package and the methamphetamine, 
the High Court admitted these “as a matter of completeness only”. 
14 In Micheal Anak Garing, the first accused, Micheal Anak Garing 
(“Micheal”), who was armed with a parang, the second accused, Tony 
Anak Imba (“Tony”), and two other friends set out one night to commit 
robbery. They attacked four victims, one after another, over the course 
of that night and into the wee hours of the following day. Their last 
victim was the deceased, who succumbed to his injuries. The question 
was whether evidence of the three earlier attacks was admissible and for 
what purpose. 
15 Defence counsel argued that evidence of the three earlier attacks 
should be inadmissible because they were prejudicial to Micheal and 
Tony, but the High Court admitted the evidence on the basis that the 
three earlier attacks formed part of the “crucial narrative” leading up to 
the commission of the offence and that they formed “an integral act 
pursuant to a common intention to assault and rob”.25 The prejudicial 
effect of the evidence thus did not outweigh its probative value. 
16 The Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court on the basis 
that the evidence was not admitted to prove Micheal and Tony’s violent 
tendencies, which would be forbidden.26 Rather, referencing s 6 of the 
Evidence Act, the evidence was important as part of a connected series 
of events that could be considered as one transaction. “If this evidence 
were rejected, the court would have only a truncated version of the 
material events which might not shed true light on the attack carried out 
on the deceased, especially because all four attacks occurred within a 
short span of time”.27 Additionally, the Court of Appeal relied on s 14 of 
the Evidence Act to admit the evidence for the purpose of showing 
Micheal and Tony’s state of mind at the time of the attack on the 
deceased. 
17 A few observations can be made about these decisions. Firstly, 
both courts in Ranjit Singh and Micheal Anak Garing used ss 6 and 9 of 
the Evidence Act to admit similar fact evidence, raising the question 
whether similar fact evidence can be admitted via these provisions in 
addition to the provisions of ss 11(b), 14 and 15, which have previously 
                                                          
25 Public Prosecutor v Micheal Anak Garing [2014] SGHC 13 at [2]. 
26 Makin v Attorney-General for New South Wales [1894] AC 57. 
27 Micheal Anak Garing v Public Prosecutor [2017] 1 SLR 748 at [10]. 
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been identified by case law. Secondly, in so doing, both courts do not 
directly address the issue of the relationship of the general and specific 
relevancy provisions under the Evidence Act but may be inferred to have 
taken the position that satisfying either would be sufficient to admit 
similar fact evidence. Thirdly, referring specifically to s 14 of the 
Evidence Act, both courts applied it in different ways. Ranjit Singh 
applied the framework – of examining cogency, relevance and strength 
of inference of a piece of evidence – from Tan Meng Jee to discuss the 
probative value of the evidence. Micheal Anak Garing did not do so and 
only referenced the requirement in Explanation 1 to s 14 that requires 
the facts in question to show that a state of mind exists “not generally 
but in reference to the particular matter in question”. These issues will be 
discussed in turn. 
III. Admitting similar fact evidence through ss 6 and 9 of 
Evidence Act 
18 Sections 6 and 9 of the Evidence Act may be regarded as general 
relevancy provisions in that they were conceived by Stephen to be an 
expression of logical relevance rather than to address recognised 
common law exclusionary rules.28 Leaving aside the issue of how the 
general relevancy provisions are meant to be applied in view of the 
specific relevancy provisions, which will be discussed later,29 it has been 
widely accepted that Stephen’s intention with respect to similar fact 
evidence was for it to be admissible chiefly via ss 14 and 15 of the 
Evidence Act.30 
19 The primary objection to a broad reliance on similar fact 
evidence is prejudice.31 As described by Ho Hock Lai, prejudice goes 
beyond the tendency of evidence to incriminate the accused, but 
consists of a number of ideas, including: (a) risk of cognitive error as 
people have a tendency to draw stronger inferences from evidence of 
past acts than is rational; (b) risk of the fact-finder being tempted to 
convict out of emotionalism rather than based on an objective and 
dispassionate assessment of the evidence; (c) fear that the accused may 
be deprived of the benefit of the presumption of innocence because the 
fact-finder may give the other evidence more weight than it objectively 
                                                          
28 See Chen Siyuan & Lionel Leo, The Law of Evidence in Singapore (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2016) at paras 2.025–2.027. 
29 See paras 27–41 below. 
30 See Chen Siyuan, “The Future of the Similar Fact Rule in an Indian Evidence Act 
Jurisdiction: Singapore” (2013) 6(3) National University of Juridical Sciences Law 
Review 361 at 363–364. 
31 See Ho Hock Lai, “An Introduction to Similar Fact Evidence” (1998) 
19 Sing LR 166 at 166. 
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deserves; and (d) that it may not be acceptable to take a person’s 
criminal past against him although it may be logical to do so.32 
20 Accordingly, ss 14 and 15 contain requirements to limit the 
admissibility of similar fact evidence. In s 14, there is a requirement that 
the evidence show that a relevant state of mind “exists not generally but 
in reference to the particular matter in question” contained in 
Explanation 1 to that section and, in s 15, “[the act in question] formed 
part of a series of similar occurrences”. One difference between these 
two sections and the common law concept of prejudice, however, is that 
these sections are predicated solely on epistemic considerations. The 
primary common law objection to similar fact may be a non-epistemic 
one, in the form of moral prejudice. Nowhere is this expressed in the 
Evidence Act. 
21 Nevertheless, can an argument be made to justify the admission 
of similar fact evidence through other provisions of the Evidence Act? 
Lee Kwang Peng has done so using s 11(b) of the Evidence Act to allow 
similar fact evidence to prove the actus reus of an offence by 
disregarding the intentions of the draftsman and arguing that as a 
matter of principle, there was no reason to distinguish admitting similar 
fact evidence to prove mens rea but not actus reus. 
22 Leaving aside that at the time of the drafting of the Evidence 
Act, there was simply no contemplation that similar fact evidence could 
be admissible to prove the actus reus of an offence,33 it may be argued 
that Stephen had not envisioned the use of similar fact evidence beyond 
proving the mens rea of an offence. 
23 In Stephen’s A Digest of the Law of Evidence,34 the similar fact 
rule was formulated as being generally one of exclusion with three 
exceptions: (a) similar facts may be generally relevant, “that is, as facts so 
related to a fact in issue that according to the common course of events 
either taken by themselves or in connection with other facts prove or 
render probable the past, present or future existence or non-existence of 
the other”; (b) prior acts which showed mental states as intention, 
                                                          
32 See Ho Hock Lai, “An Introduction to Similar Fact Evidence” (1998) 
19 Sing LR 166 at 167–170. 
33 Julius Stone, “The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact: England” (1933) 
46 Harv L Rev 954 at 972; see also Michael Hor, “Similar Fact Evidence in 
Singapore: Probative Value, Prejudice and Politics” [1999] Sing JLS 48. 
34 James Fitzjames Stephen, A Digest of the Law of Evidence (Macmillan and Co, 
4th Ed, 1887). The first edition of this digest was written in 1876. 
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knowledge or malice; and (c) acts which form a part of a series of similar 
occurrences to rebut a supposition of accident.35 
24 The second and third exceptions correspond with ss 14 and 15 
of the Evidence Act, respectively, and the first could be said to be a 
reference to the general relevancy provisions, including ss 6 and 9 of the 
Evidence Act. In other words, Stephen’s intent can be interpreted as 
being to exclude only evidence of prior acts which were relevant merely 
as propensity evidence.36 This interpretation would broaden the use of 
similar fact evidence beyond showing state of mind but would still be 
consistent with the objection of prejudice outlined earlier due to the 
limited purpose for the use of the similar fact evidence. 
25 This could perhaps be the justification for the Court of Appeal 
in Ng Beng Siang admitting similar fact evidence as a matter of 
completeness. Unfortunately, this was not expressed in that case, neither 
was it discussed by Ranjit Singh or Micheal Anak Garing. It appears that 
the courts simply take it as given that similar fact evidence can be 
admitted apart from the provisions of ss 11(b), 14 and 15 of the 
Evidence Act. 
26 Nevertheless, one could object that even by limiting the use of 
similar fact evidence admitted under ss 6 and 9 of the Evidence Act, the 
risk of the prejudice identified by Ho may still operate on the mind of 
the fact-finder. The response by the courts to this type of concern has 
essentially been to give reassurances that judges are trained fact-finders 
with the ability to disregard prejudicial evidence when the need arises.37 
Apart from that, judges in criminal cases, are duty-bound, through the 
operation of the standard of proof of beyond reasonable doubt, to 
reason through the evidence and ground their decisions in fact and logic 
and to state precisely how the evidence supports the prosecution’s theory 
of guilt.38 This ensures that accused persons are protected to some 
degree from the effects of prejudice. 
                                                          
35 See Robert Margolis, “Evidence of Similar Facts, the Evidence Act, and the Judge of 
Law as Trier-of-Fact” (1988) 9 Sing LR 103 at 117, citing James Fitzjames Stephen, 
A Digest of the Law of Evidence (Macmillan and Co, 4th Ed, 1887) at pp 15, 
153-156 and 161. 
36 See Robert Margolis, “Evidence of Similar Facts, the Evidence Act, and the Judge of 
Law as Trier-of-Fact” (1988) 9 Sing LR 103 at 117–119; see also Ho Hock Lai, 
“An Introduction to Similar Fact Evidence” (1998) 19 Sing LR 166 at 195. 
37 See, eg, Wong Kim Poh v Public Prosecutor [1992] 1 SLR(R) 13 at [14]; Tan Meng 
Jee v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 178 at [48], citing Tan Chee Kieng v Public 
Prosecutor [1994] 2 SLR(R) 577. This is not unique to Singapore courts: see, eg, 
Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Siu Yuk-Shing [1989] 1 WLR 236 at 241. 
38 See Jagatheesan s/o Krishnasamy v Public Prosecutor [2006] 4 SLR 45 at [56] and 
Thong Ah Fat v Public Prosecutor [2012] 1 SLR 676 at [15]–[25] and [28]–[45]. 
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IV. Relationship between general and specific relevancy 
provisions in admitting similar fact evidence 
27 Coming back now to the issue of whether in relation to similar 
fact evidence, it must be necessary to fulfil a general relevancy provision 
(ss 6–11 of the Evidence Act) and a specific relevancy provision (ss 14 
and 15 of the Evidence Act) or whether fulfilling either is sufficient, the 
courts in Ranjit Singh and Micheal Anak Garing do not directly address 
this matter. However, the approaches taken in those cases suggest that 
fulfilling either a general or specific relevancy provision would be 
sufficient to admit similar fact evidence, such that even if a piece of 
evidence does not pass muster under a specific relevancy provision, 
a general relevancy provision can be used to admit it. 
28 In Ranjit Singh, the court’s treatment of the disputed portions of 
Ranjit and Farid’s statements seemed to rely on both ss 14 and 15 as well 
as ss 6 and 9 being met. However, in relation to the photographs, the 
High Court admitted those only as a matter of completeness. This 
suggests that it would be sufficient to fulfil a general relevancy 
provision, such as ss 6 or 9, to admit similar fact evidence, with the 
qualifier that the purpose of admitting such evidence is merely to give 
the court a complete account of the events and the evidence cannot be 
used to establish guilt of the accused. 
29 The Court of Appeal in Micheal Anak Garing also took a 
position consistent with this by agreeing with the High Court’s 
admission of the three earlier attacks under s 6 of the Evidence Act not 
to prove Michael and Tony’s violent tendencies, but only so that the 
court did not have a truncated version of the material events. 
30 It is far from settled whether a general relevancy provision is 
sufficient to admit evidence even when it fails the requirements of a 
specific relevancy provision or whether both a general and specific 
relevancy provision must be satisfied. We know that Stephen 
distinguished between relevant facts which arise directly from the 
circumstances of the case, and relevant facts arising from previous 
incidents or transactions;39 however, we do not know the purpose of his 
drawing such a distinction. 
31 It could be argued that this distinction should point to the 
conclusion that once a piece of evidence is potentially prejudicial, the 
                                                          
39 Ho Hock Lai, “An Introduction to Similar Fact Evidence” (1998) 19 Sing LR 166 
at 195–198. 
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general relevancy provisions do not apply at all.40 Otherwise, this would 
render the specific relevancy provisions otiose, especially when they 
embody the exceptions to the common law exclusionary rules. Another 
way of addressing this concern is to require both a general relevancy 
provision and a specific relevancy provision to be satisfied before 
evidence is admitted under Pt I of the Evidence Act.41 
32 However, it could also be argued that absent any express 
indication that general relevancy provisions could not be used to admit 
evidence otherwise inadmissible under the specific relevancy provisions, 
satisfying either would be sufficient for the purposes of relevancy and 
admissibility. Otherwise, what would be the function of the general 
relevancy provisions?42 Additionally, this approach may be justified by a 
literal interpretation of s 5 of the Evidence Act, which allows any fact to 
be proved as long as it fulfils any relevancy provision, whether general 
or specific. 
33 Based on the decisions of Ng Beng Siang, Ranjit Singh and 
Micheal Anak Garing, it seems that the courts would prefer the latter 
approach as it would allow them to receive as much evidence as possible 
to assist them in decision-making. Nevertheless, it would be important 
for the court to address this issue and articulate reasons for choosing 
one framework over the other in order to guide a clear and structured 
understanding of how Pt I of the Evidence Act is to be applied. 
34 This would additionally benefit the understanding of s 6 of the 
Evidence Act, as that section could also be treated as an embodiment of 
the common law res gestae doctrine, which is an exception to the rule 
against hearsay. Under the res gestae doctrine, “a fact or a statement of 
fact or opinion which is so closely associated in time, place, and 
circumstances with some act, event, or state of affairs which is in issue 
that it can be said to form a part of the same transaction as the act or 
event in issue, is itself admissible in evidence”.43 One would expect the 
exceptions to exclusionary rules to be contained amongst ss 14–57, yet 
s 6 seems an outlier as it contains language that brings to mind the 
res gestae doctrine. 
                                                          
40 Ho Hock Lai, “An Introduction to Similar Fact Evidence” (1998) 19 Sing LR 166 
at 195–198. 
41 Jeffrey Pinsler SC, Evidence and the Litigation Process (Lexis Nexis, 6th Ed, 2017) 
at para 2.55. 
42 See Siyuan Chen, “Redefining Relevancy and Exclusionary Discretion in Sir James 
Fitzjames Stephen’s Indian Evidence Act of 1872: The Singapore Experiment and 
Lessons for Other Indian Evidence Act Jurisdictions” (2014) 10(1) International 
Commentary on Evidence 1 at 1–10. 
43 Adrian Keane & Paul McKeown, The Modern Law of Evidence (Oxford University 
Press, 9th Ed, 2012) at p 355. 
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35 The relationship between the res gestae doctrine and the rule 
against similar fact evidence is also a matter worthy of consideration 
that has not received attention. In Micheal Anak Garing, before 
commenting that the evidence of the previous attacks on other 
individuals was relevant under s 14 of the Evidence Act in relation to the 
state of mind of Micheal and Tony, the court relied on s 6 to admit the 
same evidence citing the case of O’Leary v R.44 In that case, the High 
Court of Australia held that evidence of assaults committed by the 
appellant on different persons prior to his killing of one Ballard, for 
which the appellant was charged with murder, was admissible at the 
appellant’s trial for murder as it disclosed a connected series of events 
which should be considered as one transaction, which needed to be 
understood as a whole.45 Using s 6 to admit similar fact evidence in this 
manner presents the risk that the forbidden line of propensity reasoning 
may influence the fact-finder and prejudice the accused, especially when 
it is possible to interpret s 6 broadly to include events taking place 
months before the alleged offence.46 Reference may be made to Illus (o) 
to s 14 to demonstrate the risk of prejudice. Illustration (o) provides that 
where A is tried for the murder of B by intentionally shooting him dead, 
the fact that A, on other occasions, shot at B is relevant as showing his 
intention to shoot B, but the fact that A was in the habit of shooting at 
people with intent to murder them is irrelevant. If one were to rely on 
s 6 to admit the fact that A was in the habit of shooting at people with 
intent to murder them on the basis that these other shootings formed 
part of the same transaction, this would enable prejudicial evidence that 
would otherwise be inadmissible under s 14 to be admitted via s 6.47 
36 Nevertheless, assuming similar fact evidence can be admitted 
via a general relevancy provision without more, another issue that arises 
from Ranjit Singh and Micheal Anak Garing is the basis for 
superimposing Boardman onto ss 6 and 9 of the Evidence Act although 
                                                          
44 (1946) 73 CLR 566. 
45 See O’Leary v R (1946) 73 CLR 566 at 577. 
46 See Don Promphinit v Public Prosecutor [1994] 2 SLR(R) 1030, where the three 
appellants were charged with selling cannabis to an undercover narcotics officer, 
whose evidence pertaining to negotiations and abortive sales that took place 
between him and two of the appellants over a period of three months was admitted 
under s 6 and also ss 14 and 15 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed). This 
decision has been criticised for permitting evidence to be admitted no matter how 
prejudicial, if it leads to the commission of the offence even though s 6 
contemplates admitting evidence that is crucial to the understanding of the facts in 
issue in the interest of proper adjudication; see also Jeffrey Pinsler SC, Evidence 
and the Litigation Process (Lexis Nexis, 6th Ed, 2017) at p 291. 
47 It may be noted that the court in Micheal Anak Garing v Public Prosecutor [2017] 
1 SLR 748 did not refer to Illus (o) although it alluded to Explanation 1 to s 14. 
This illustration would seem to apply to the case as the three earlier attacks were 
against persons other than the deceased. 
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one can perhaps understand the motivation for so doing. Nothing was 
said about this in Micheal Anak Garing. In Ranjit Singh, it seems that the 
High Court treated it as given that before similar fact evidence is 
admitted under any provision of the Evidence Act, the Boardman test 
must be satisfied. By limiting the purpose of using similar fact evidence, 
the courts can justify that the prejudicial effect of the evidence does not 
outweigh its probative value simply because the evidence will not be 
used to actually prove the facts in issue or relevant facts. 
37 However, given that Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo 
Phyllis48 (“Phyllis Tan”) has persuasively ruled that the starting point 
before common law rules may be applied in Singapore is to consider 
whether such rules are consistent with the provisions of the Evidence 
Act under s 2(2) and that the High Court decision of Public Prosecutor v 
Mas Swan bin Adnan49 (“Mas Swan”) observed that relying on 
Boardman to exclude similar fact evidence that would otherwise be 
deemed relevant by the categorisation approach under the Evidence Act 
provisions is inconsistent with the Evidence Act,50 silence on the basis 
for superimposing Boardman on ss 6 and 9 of the Evidence Act is 
surprising. 
38 Reliance on Ng Beng Siang is also insufficient as that decision 
predated Phyllis Tan and similarly did not deal with s 2(2) of the 
Evidence Act. In fact, the decision in Ng Beng Siang did not even 
reference any section of the Evidence Act as a basis for admitting similar 
fact evidence as background or for the sake of completeness. 
39 It is doubtful if the Boardman test could be properly 
superimposed on ss 6 and 9 of the Evidence Act, which were the 
provisions cited by Ranjit Singh and Micheal Anak Garing. Section 6 
deems facts as relevant by virtue of them being “so connected with a fact 
in issue as to form part of the same transaction”. Section 9 is much 
broader and treats as relevant “facts necessary to explain or introduce a 
fact in issue or relevant fact, or which support or rebut an inference 
suggested by a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which establish the 
identity of any thing or person whose identity is relevant, or fix the time 
or place at which any fact in issue or relevant fact happened or which 
                                                          
48 [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [124]–[126]. This has since been affirmed in a number of 
Court of Appeal decisions as well. 
49 [2011] SGHC 107. 
50 This observation in Public Prosecutor v Mas Swan bin Adnan [2011] SGHC 107 
specifically concerned Tan Meng Jee v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 178’s 
reliance on Director of Public Prosecutions v Boardman [1975] AC 421 and 
excluding similar fact evidence that is otherwise deemed relevant under ss 14 and 
15 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed). However, the principle behind this 
observation has broader application beyond ss 14 and 15. 
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show the relation of parties by whom any such fact was transacted”. The 
requirements in these provisions are categorical ones that relate to the 
probative value of the evidence; they do not require any balancing 
against prejudicial effect.51 
40 Further, in the light of the developments in the law recognising 
that the courts have an inherent power to exclude evidence where its 
prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value,52 it may well be timely to 
revisit the question of whether the approach of superimposing the 
Boardman test onto the provisions of the Evidence Act is appropriate, 
even for ss 11(b), 14 and 15 of the Evidence Act as described in 
Tan Meng Jee and Lee Kwang Peng. Putting aside Boardman’s consistency 
with the Evidence Act and its usefulness, which will be discussed later,53 
and focusing on the value of conceptual clarity, rather than have the 
balancing exercise being done twice – once as part of applying the 
provisions of the Evidence Act, and twice as a matter of the court 
exercising its inherent discretionary power to exclude evidence – similar 
fact evidence could be admitted as long as the requirements of any 
general or specific relevancy provision are fulfilled and the courts can 
then address the issue of prejudice while exercising their discretion to 
exclude. 
41 This approach would not fall foul of s 2(2) of the Evidence Act 
since evidence otherwise admissible under the relevancy provisions 
would not be excluded by virtue of a common law rule of evidence, but 
only in exceptional situations where the inherent powers of the court to 
exclude evidence are exercised.54 We now turn to discussing the 
appropriateness of applying the Boardman test in the context of s 14 of 
the Evidence Act as well as the usefulness of the test. 
                                                          
51 This criticism has been made by academics of Tan Meng Jee v Public Prosecutor 
[1996] 2 SLR(R) 178 superimposing Director of Public Prosecutions v Boardman 
[1975] AC 421 on ss 14 and 15 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed): see 
Jeffrey Pinsler SC, Evidence and the Litigation Process (Lexis Nexis, 6th Ed, 2017) 
at para 3.32 and Chen Siyuan, “Revisiting the Similar Fact Rule in Singapore: 
Public Prosecutor v Mas Swan bin Adnan and Another” [2011] Sing JLS 553. 
52 See Muhammad bin Kadar v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 1205. Although the 
Court of Appeal in ANB v ANC [2015] 5 SLR 522 hinted that this test may not be 
suitable in civil proceedings, no alternative has yet been offered by the court. 
Jeffrey Pinsler has, however, suggested that there can be a broader basis to exclude 
evidence when the manner in which it has been obtained compromises the 
integrity of the administration of justice: see Jeffrey Pinsler SC, “The Court’s 
Discretion to Exclude Evidence in Civil Cases and Emerging Implications in the 
Criminal Sphere: The Violet Thread of Justice” (2016) 28 SAcLJ 89. 
53 See paras 42–51 below. 
54 See Jeffrey Pinsler SC, “Admissibility and the Discretion to Exclude Evidence: In 
Search of a Systematic Approach” (2013) 25 SAcLJ 215 at 223. 
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V. Boardman balancing and s 14 of Evidence Act 
42 The first difficulty with superimposing Boardman onto s 14 of 
the Evidence Act is that it is unclear whether it is to be assumed that as 
long as a piece of evidence comes within the ambit of s 14, the 
Boardman test should be taken as satisfied, or vice versa, or whether 
Boardman is to be applied as a separate and distinct requirement. 
43 Tan Meng Jee had stated that Boardman was “implicit” in ss 14 
and 15 based on the argument that the language of those provisions 
contemplated some balancing.55 However, Lee Kwang Peng then stated 
that before a judge may consider evidence as relevant under ss 14 or 15, 
that fact “must first satisfy” the Boardman test.56 
44 Ranjit Singh’s application of Boardman seemed to follow the 
latter, where it separately examined the cogency, relevance and strength 
of inference of the evidence after determining that it fell within s 14, 
whereas Micheal Anak Garing seemed to follow the former where it did 
not specifically address the Boardman test but found that the evidence 
came within the requirements of s 14. 
45 This difference in approach shows the problem with trying to 
justify the importation of Boardman by arguing that it is implicit within 
the language of s 14. If so, it seems illogical that applying the Boardman 
test should lead to a result that is different from relying on the 
requirements of the provisions. Yet, this may be so, particularly in the 
situation highlighted by Mas Swan, where the evidence satisfies the 
requirements of the provision but where its prejudicial effect outweighs 
its probative value. It should further be emphasised that s 14 does not 
contain any concept of balancing or reference to prejudicial effect. 
46 The second difficulty with the Boardman test is that the exercise 
of balancing probative value against prejudicial effect can be an 
impossible one. As has been observed from various quarters, probative 
value and prejudicial effect are not antithetical to each other and may 
even be positively correlated, making the exercise of balancing one 
against the other impossible.57 There is also the further question of the 
                                                          
55 See Tan Meng Jee v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 178 at [49]. As alluded to 
earlier, despite stating this, this case seemed to apply the Boardman test in lieu of 
ss 14 and 15 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed). 
56 See Lee Kwang Peng v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 SLR(R) 569 at [38]. 
57 See Michael Hor, “Similar Fact Evidence in Singapore: Probative Value, Prejudice 
and Politics” [1999] Sing JLS 48 at 50 and Chen Siyuan, “Revisiting the Similar Fact 
Rule in Singapore: Public Prosecutor v Mas Swan bin Adnan and Another” [2011] 
Sing JLS 553 at 555. 
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applicability of these concepts to civil proceedings highlighted by the 
Court of Appeal in ANB v ANC.58 
47 The reasons given by the court in Ranjit Singh for admitting the 
similar fact evidence demonstrate this difficulty – the court highlighted 
the probative value of the evidence in terms of its cogency, relevance and 
the strength of the inference that may be drawn from it and then seemed 
to conclude that the prejudicial effect of the evidence was outweighed by 
its probative value without any real balancing being done. 
48 Finally, the Boardman test is vague in terms of breadth and 
reach. As Jeffrey Pinsler SC put it, “the process of balancing probative 
value against prejudicial effect can be applied generally to any situation 
in which admissible evidence may result in injustice at trial”.59 It is far 
from clear what the limits of the concepts of “prejudicial effect” and 
“probative value” are. 
49 It has been observed how the concept of prejudice encompasses 
many ideas.60 Prejudice may also embody the concept of unfairness, 
which could include unfairness in the process of obtaining evidence in 
addition to unfairness of the trial proceedings.61 For example, in 
Muhammad bin Kadar v Public Prosecutor,62 the prejudice to the accused 
was identified as arising from flagrant procedural breaches in the taking 
of statements by the police. 
50 Ranjit Singh shows how “probative value” may be stretched 
beyond considering how the evidence supports a fact in issue or relevant 
fact to include consideration of a co-accused wishing to rely on similar 
fact evidence contained in his own statements, as well as possible 
defences that the accused had because the objection to the evidence 
came at an early stage of the trial when it remained unclear what his 
defence would be. The High Court in Ranjit Singh suggested that these 
two factors militated against excluding the similar fact evidence. 
51 This manner of applying the Boardman test is unusual and 
shows the court’s need for a more flexible tool that can better take into 
account the interests of justice in each case. Even if the court was 
considering these two additional factors separately from the Boardman 
                                                          
58 [2015] 5 SLR 522 at [30]. 
59 Jeffrey Pinsler SC, Evidence and the Litigation Process (Lexis Nexis, 6th Ed, 2017) 
at para 3.32. 
60 Ho Hock Lai, “An Introduction to Similar Fact Evidence” (1998) 19 Sing LR 166 
at 167–170. 
61 See Tan Yock Lin, “Sing a Song of Sang, a Pocketful of Woes?” [1992] Sing JLS 365 
at 373–374 for a discussion on the difficulties with the concept of “unfairness”. 
62 [2011] 3 SLR 1205. 
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test, the point about the insufficiency of the Boardman test would 
remain. 
VI. Conclusion 
52 The cases of Ranjit Singh and Micheal Anak Garing exemplify an 
approach where the courts do not discuss the conceptual and normative 
justification for admitting or excluding evidence, taking us further down 
the path of pragmatism over principle. 
53 However, perhaps this is inevitable given the state of the law of 
evidence in Singapore. There have been precious little substantive 
amendments to the Evidence Act that consider developments in the 
common law as well as the legislative revisions undertaken in other 
jurisdictions. What we have are ad hoc changes to particular areas of 
evidence law without an appreciation for how this could affect the entire 
scheme of the Evidence Act. The latest round of proposed amendments 
that have been released for public consultation continue down this path. 
The courts do what they can, sometimes ignoring the Evidence Act and 
stretching the words of the Evidence Act in ways ordinary users of the 
English language would find incredible. Perhaps the Legislature, seeing 
that the courts can find their own ways to deal with the problem, do not 
see any need to intervene. But this is mere speculation. 
54 Many commentators have called for amendments to the 
Evidence Act over the years. It may well be time to begin a thorough 
revision now that the development of the law by the courts has resulted 
in irreconcilable and confusing positions being taken. These changes 
should consider how the general relevancy provisions operate in relation 
to the specific relevancy provisions, whether the discretion to exclude 
evidence in the interests of justice should be a generally applicable one 
rather than being limited in expression to the areas of hearsay and 
opinion evidence in ss 32(3) and 47(4) of the Evidence Act, and whether 
the factors that the court should consider in deciding whether to 
exclude evidence in the interests of justice should replace the 
Boardman test. 
 
